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FEBRUARY MEETING, 1866.

A stated monthly meeting of the Society was held this day, Thursday, February 8th, at eleven o'clock, A.M.; the President in the chair.

The Librarian announced donations from the City of Boston; the New-England Loyal-Publication Society; the Society for Promoting American Industry; the State Historical Society of Iowa; the Sussex Archæological Society; the Trustees of the Boston Athenæum; the Trustees of the Public Library of the City of Boston; the Publisher of the "Right Way"; John Appleton, M.D.; Mr. John Bartlett; Horatio Bigelow, Esq.; T. M. Bugbee, Esq.; Rev. Charles Burroughs, D.D.; Mr. E. C. Cowdin; Henry B. Dawson, Esq.; Henry G. Denny, Esq.; Henry Edwards, Esq.; Daniel C. Gilman, Esq.; Rev. I. F. Holton; Hon. Samuel Hooper; Franklin B. Hough, M.D.; Benjamin P. Johnson, Esq.; Messrs. Alfred Mudge & Son; Mr. Joel S. Orne; David Pulsifer, Esq.; Hon. Alexander H. Rice; Rev. Edwin M. Stone; Mr. John K. Wiggin; Mrs. Joseph E. Worcester; and from Messrs. Amory, Dana, Green, Lawrence, Palmer, C. Robbins, Sibley, Webb, and Winthrop, of the Society.

The President called attention to the second volume of the "Hutchinson Papers" lying upon the table, recently reprinted by the "Prince Society," and presented a few weeks since by Mr. Lawrence, who had also given

the Society the first volume issued in the early part of the last year.

The President also announced, as a gift to the Society, a large-paper copy of Mr. Sibley's "Notices of the Catalogues of Harvard College," from the author.

Ex-Governor John A. Andrew was elected a Resident Member.

The President noticed the death of the Rev. Eliphalet Nott, D.D., a Corresponding Member, in the ninety-third year of his age.

Dr. LOTHROP gave some interesting reminiscences of Dr. Nott.

Mr. SAVAGE expressed the hope, that, although the Society holds itself under no obligation to publish memoirs of its Corresponding Members, Dr. Lothrop should be charged with the service of furnishing some memorial of Dr. Nott, for the Society's Proceedings; and the suggestion was adopted by the Society.

Mr. WATERSTON presented, with some remarks, a copy of "The Knightly Soldier," written by H. C. Trumbull; and a copy of a "Memorial of James S. Wadsworth," by the Hon. Lewis F. Allen.

He also communicated, for the acceptance of the Society, a copy of the "Proceedings of the Century Association in memory of Brigadier-General James S. Wadsworth and Col. Peter A. Porter, Dec. 3, 1864," presented by Martin Brimmer, Esq.; also a copy of a "Memorial of Major Edward Granville Park," by his father, the Hon. John C. Park, — a gift of the author.

Proper acknowledgments were directed to be made for these gifts.

THE REV. CHARLES BURROUGHS, D.D., of Portsmouth, a Corresponding Member, being present, communicated to the Society a deed, from Robert Tufton Mason to Elizabeth Beck, of land in New Hampshire, dated the 28th of April, 1686. He also presented, after having read, two letters of "Mary Pepperrell" to her husband, Sir William Pepperrell; one dated October 9th, 1740, the other September 22nd, 1749, both from "Kittery."

Dr. Burroughs also presented a volume, written by himself, being "A Tribute to the Memory of Commander John Collins Long, of the United-States Navy."

MR. W. G. BROOKS presented four broadside proclamations of Provincial Governors of Massachusetts, — one of Governor Pownall, dated October 13th, 1759, appointing the 25th instant as a day of public thanksgiving; one of Governor Pownall, dated 24th March, 1760, appointing the 3d of April for a general fast, on account of a destructive fire in the town of Boston, on the 20th of March; one of Governor Bernard, appointing the 7th of October, 1762, as a day of thanksgiving; and one of Lieutenant-Governor Hutchinson, appointing the 18th of April as a day of fasting and prayer.

MR. HALE exhibited a number of Duchesne's models of public and private buildings in Boston, made sometime during the years 1812–1816.

The President presented copies of the following letters, written by the Marquis of Buckingham, and addressed to Sir John Temple, His Majesty's Consul-general to the United States, residing in New York. The recent death of Lord Palmerston, who was of the family of Temple, had given occasion to renewed investigations of the

Temple pedigree, and particularly of the old Baronetcy of Stowe. One of these letters contained the announcement that the title to that Baronetcy had devolved upon the son-in-law of Governor Bowdoin. All the letters were among the Bowdoin Papers in his possession: —

Marquis of Buckingham to Sir John Temple.

DEAR SIR, — Your letter of the 31st July reached Stowe after I had left it, and was forwarded to me here. I conceive myself just in time to answer it before you embark. I am sorry that you have not obtained that title which seems to me really essential to the object of your mission, and which I *know* that Mr. Pitt considered in the same light. I conceive, therefore, that His Majesty must be hampered by some engagements for the same honor, which it may not be expedient to gratify *at present*. This is only a suggestion; but it is what occurs to me upon a point which ought not to have been matter of conversation for five minutes.

I receive with much satisfaction the news of Mr. Bowdoin's election to the chair of the Massachusetts State, as I have much confidence in the cool and steady integrity of that respectable gentleman: public confidence in such a character was never more requisite than in this moment. You know my opinions upon a commercial intercourse between Great Britain and America. I must ever think we are unwise, if we expect a useful trade with the United States, till we have opened to them some medium of remittance. What that is to be is indeed matter of very serious doubt; and I have no difficulty in saying, that the disgraceful scenes of violence which have taken place in some parts of that continent do not seem likely to conciliate that cool and temperate disposition which alone can procure the happy consequences which I so seriously wish. As to a treaty of commerce, I have seen nothing to change my opinions upon the inefficacy and inexpediency of it. I never knew one attended with the advantages proposed by the contracting parties; and in every instance they are certain seeds of fraud and discord. America has, as Mr. Bowdoin observes, the undoubted right of regulating her commerce, and even of giving a preference to any nation who will purchase it by treaty, or by reciprocal advantages. Hitherto she has almost universally laid a heavy impost on British commodities in favor of all other nations. I am yet to learn what advan-

tage she has derived from such a system ; and she must know that (after time has been given for hot minds to cool) Great Britain can more easily afford to lose the *direct* trade to the United States than they can : for it is plain that in this country restrictive laws can be enforced, and it is equally certain that in America every argument which has ever been used to show the inexpediency and impracticability of such a system applies to the utmost advantage, when it is considered that we retain Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and the Bahamas as the certain objects for our illicit commerce, which I will venture to say may be insured into any port of your continent at a less premium than the duty of five per cent. now laid upon them. But the war of duties is of all others the most odious, and ultimately the most ruinous. I will hope for a real union of interests, and for reciprocal good offices to each other ; but the difference hitherto has not been (allow me to say) favorable to the national character of America ; for the British trader carried his effects to your ports under the faith of nations, and under the protection of a system of commerce which was understood to be reciprocally open. In so doing, he took no unfair advantage, nor did our Government mark to America any exclusive restraint, when we put her on the same footing with all other foreign nations who traded with us or with our islands. On the other hand, particular restraints, particular legal difficulties, and particular duties, have been applied through every State, as the system under which they mean to admit the British trade, and consequently as the system under which they reasonably expect to see their own admitted into the English ports. Much remains to be done upon all these subjects ; and although I am happy to see that State in which your connections lie, more immediately in the hands of a character so respectable as Mr. Bowdoin's, yet perhaps I may for his sake wish that he had suffered another year to pass over ; as I am convinced that nothing but experience can bring back the mind of America to cool reflection from the intoxication which her independence has given to her. The hour of our national insolence is gone by, and I trust that we have profited by the lesson of adversity. That of America yet hangs over her ; and, unless I am greatly deceived, she must inevitably drink deep of that bitter cup, if the wisdom of her councils do not interfere to check materially the popular frenzy and violence. The corruption of France, the resentment and antipathy towards Britain, the jealousy of each other, and above all the national weakness of America, must all operate to consequences most certain and most obvious. In all this, however, my

dear Sir, your path is clear, either as a public or private man. I do not know your instructions; but I know it is not for the policy, the honor, or the interest of that power whom you are there to represent, to interfere in the domestic differences of America: but, at the same time, it is necessary that she should know, that our interests are less in her power than, in the moments of her frenzy, she may imagine. I have now only to add my sincere wishes for you and yours; for the success of your undertaking, so far as it may contribute to your credit or to your character; and to assure you that I am with great truth and regard, dear Sir, your very faithful and obedient servant,

NUGENT BUCKINGHAM.

MARGATE, July 8, 1785.

P. S. — I have this moment received advice from a correspondent at Minorca, that the “Kingfisher” sloop-of-war was arrived from Algiers, with news of their peace with Spain; and that the Dey of Algiers had, on the 13th of July, declared war in form against America; and that, on the 14th, twelve frigates, equipped by him for the Spanish war, had sailed to cruise in the Bay and elsewhere for all American ships; and notice of this declaration of war had been sent to all their corsairs who were out. Tunis and Morocco had already declared war against America.

Be so good as to let me hear from you under cover to Lord Carmarthen’s office.

Marquis of Buckingham to Sir John Temple.

STOWE, Sept. 2, 1786.

DEAR SIR, — Having lately returned from a long tour into the West of England, I have not had an opportunity of thanking you for the continuation of your very interesting correspondence. My letter of May last will have explained to you my ideas upon the situation of the commercial and national situation of the United States. The difficulties of carrying on a correspondence upon nice points across the Atlantic prevented me from saying much more than what was clear to the comprehension of any man; but every account from you, and every mail, confirms me in those opinions that their present form of federal government is wholly unfit for the purposes of peace or war, and that some convulsion must sooner or later do that which wisdom and moderation cannot guide. Every hour will add to her distress; and every adjudication of those courts, which have so grossly violated the first principles of justice, with respect to debts contracted since the peace, and of national faith, with regard to those secured by the treaty, has

tended to weaken the confidence of the merchant, and consequently to raise upon the American consumer the price of those goods which she must take from Europe, and consequently from England, either directly or through other nations. This system, so weakly aimed at England and so fatally operating upon themselves, began before you sailed; and you remember how exactly we agreed upon the probable consequences of it. Different circumstances have accumulated to increase those difficulties, in proportion as the prosperity of Great Britain, rising beyond the wildest speculations of fancy, has enabled us to take steps for securing to ourselves and to our remaining colonies those advantages to which America owed her strength and resources. That measure, however fatally it may operate upon her trade, is (as is clear to every inquisitive mind) but half complete; and very much remains to be done if America persists in her wild war of prohibitions and impotent restrictions. Have any of their governors weighed the consequences to the United States of this commercial treaty which France is known to press with the most earnest attention, and to which it is hoped a very speedy conclusion may take place? If Spain joins in the same treaty, are there not possible consequences which America may foresee well worthy her attention? And yet, my dear Sir, I will prophesy that the crisis of her frenzy is not yet arrived; but that she will wait till bankruptcy, political as well as individual, has taught her that, in the moment in which she rejected Great Britain as a parent, it was essential to her existence to court us as the most valuable and the most natural friends. In the mean time, her West India trade, either to our islands or those of France and Spain, whose orders are more peremptory even than ours, is gone; her fisheries almost annihilated, except for home consumption, and even these rivalled in her own markets; her Mediterranean and Southern trade commanded almost entirely by the Barbary powers; and her imposts to Great Britain exposed to the possibility of severe retaliation of prohibitory duties, which may be enforced here, and never can in America. You will have known before this, that the two deputies commissioned to treat with Algiers have returned from thence *re infectâ*, and indeed the event of the embassy might have been foreseen; for even if Algiers had accepted the tribute which she demanded, every other Barbary power, viz., Morocco, Tunis, and the Bey of Constantine, would have covered the cruisers, and America would have daily found some new flag, which she would be compelled to crush by force or to buy. The state of our public credit must almost appear romance to those re-

moved from the scene of action ; it has gone beyond the most sanguine imagination ; and the only fact which seems certain is, that it has not yet found its pitch. The stocks may, in some slight degree, continue liable to the little fluctuation which the tricks of jobbers, and the inexplicable management in the alley, may produce ; but the operation of the annual million which is daily employed in pouring money into the market, and in withdrawing that fluctuating stock, will have raised our credit, by this double effect, to an extent of which it is not yet easy to see the limits. The recent death of the King of Prussia gives a strong proof of their solidity ; for, although it is more than probable that this event may have a very serious and a very rapid effect upon the politics of Europe, they have barely appeared to feel it, and are now higher than immediately before that event. To this picture of national prosperity the language of party can add nothing, nor can it detract from it ; the proofs are in the hands of every one : but this should be known where they may furnish a useful lesson of the benefit arising from government, industry, and unimpeached integrity in national as well as individual engagements.

To this, my dear Sir, I have very little to add, except that I have gradually recovered my health, so as to be at ease from the alarms which I expressed to you in my last letter. Your situation, though possibly unpleasant from political considerations, is, I hope, perfectly eligible to you from the health and comfort of your family. New York was in former times one of the most eligible places of residence on your continent : how far the Revolution, by changing the relative situations of individuals, has altered the general manners, I have not heard ; but, from general accounts, it seems preferable to any other city in America. My time is employed in society and in amusements, continuing the same earnest wishes for the success of the King's government, and for my own personal repose ; yet I cannot avoid speculating upon political subjects, particularly if they are interesting to the credit and character of those to whom I wish well. From this consideration I have thought much upon American politics, being with great regard, and with every good wish towards you, dear sir, your very faithful and obedient servant,

NUGENT BUCKINGHAM.

The Marquis of Buckingham to Sir John Temple.

STOWE, Dec. 3, 1786.

DEAR SIR, — By the address upon this letter you will have learnt that you are in possession of a rank which you so much wished. I

should, in consequence of your letter, which I received by the November packet, have earnestly pressed for that mark of distinction from His Majesty; but our worthy kinsman, Sir Richard Temple, who died only in the preceding week, and having left no issue, the title devolves upon you, as heir male to Sir Peter Temple, my great-great-grandfather, and your great-grandfather. I have taken care to notify this to Lord Carmarthen, in order that you may be acknowledged as baronet in his addresses to you, which is the only mode in which it is ever done; and I trust that you will do credit to one of the oldest titles now extant in the baronetage, and one that has never been disgraced by any of the many generations through which it has passed. I know that a great mind wishes to rest its pretensions upon its own merit, rather than upon those of an ancestry, however illustrious; but the policy of all governments has annexed a respectability to the descendants of those who have deserved well from their country. And perhaps it may seem contradictory to the spirit of republicanism, but in fact in no government has this system been more generally admitted to its utmost extent than in the purest times of the Greek and Roman Republics, and of those of more modern date in Europe. In every point of view, then, I am truly glad of your accession to this hereditary title, in preference to one of more modern date.

You are very good in pressing me so much upon the subject of my picture. I came to town so late last winter, in consequence of my long and dangerous illness, and left it so soon, being ordered to Bath, that I did not give Mr. Trumbull a sitting. However, upon my return to town, I will take care that it shall be finished. I have given the King's picture to my corporation of Buckingham, so that I fear that I cannot gratify your wishes: however, I will endeavor; but in that case I do not know who your agent is here, to whom I am to deliver it. However, if I do not find him out, I must trust it to some trader, if I can get it for you.

Your picture of the present state of the United States does not belie my prophecy. It was easy to foresee this scene; the solution to it is not so obvious. A few months will bring part of these questions to issue, by the failure of their pecuniary engagements to France, Spain, and Holland. I think I have reason to believe that the first will not be trifled with, and that America will find her confidence in the forbearance of France misplaced. The change of her politics and opinions as to the United States, her disappointment in the expectations which she had formed from the American commerce,

and, above all, the difficult state of the French finances (for in this year they have borrowed six millions sterling, and have only paid off two millions), are the probable causes which have induced their determination. I do not believe that they will even temporize, but they certainly will not give up interest or principal. In Holland the case is very different. The loan was raised, not from the public fund, but from the purses of individuals; and France is bound for it. You will therefore see most clearly that these Dutch speculators will have their money; and I fancy that the most sanguine American does not expect that France will help them in this business. There is a report that France has thrown out the idea of a cession of Rhode Island to her in discharge of this debt, or to be held in the same manner as the cautionary towns were delivered by the Dutch to Queen Elizabeth. These ideas are possibly floating only at present, but they exist, and perhaps are not known in America. In the midst of this scene of anarchy, misrule, and bankruptcy, both public and private, it is for the wisdom, interest, and dignity of Great Britain, to preserve not only the strictest neutrality, but even to guard against the appearance of intermeddling with the internal arrangements of America; but, in doing this, I do not believe that any consideration will induce us to give way upon the subject of our new navigation act, the blessings of which we now feel in the hourly aggrandizement of our commerce and our navigation. This new commercial treaty with France stands upon grounds so singularly advantageous to us, that we are in a situation to laugh at the commercial restrictions of European powers, and much more so to those of America, whose ports, from local circumstances, must be exposed, and whose consumption must be secured to us in all articles where we can undersell the foreign merchant. And I do not apprehend that America will find her own manufactures or revenue much improved by the only operation of her restrictive laws, which, if they are enforced, can only drive us to export our goods circuitously through a French port. These considerations, urged upon us by the petulant and almost contemptible jealousy of America, must throw aside every idea of a nearer conciliation at present. She has not yet recovered from her intoxication of independence; and as she has chosen the lesson of experience instead of that which she might have collected from reason, policy, and dispassionate disquisition, she must expect the usual consequences of that lesson, always unpleasant, but perhaps ultimately the safest in proportion to the impression which their distresses must make. In the meantime, we

will look with pride and satisfaction at the state of this kingdom. After funding thirty millions in the two last years, our commerce and shipping has increased with an elasticity proportioned only to their depression during the war. Our tonnage of shipping is increased one-eighth beyond the state of the united shipping of Great Britain and of her colonies in 1774. Our manufacturers are unable to execute the orders poured upon them from all quarters of Europe. The exchange, already ten per cent. in our favor, is hourly rising. Our revenue has paid off one million of our debt in nine months; and our prospects of peace are secured to us by these treaties of commerce, which are extending themselves to Spain, Portugal, and Russia.

I have given you this general state of our situation, because you probably receive your accounts of us in America through a jealous or gloomy medium. I have not gone beyond the strict line of fact in this description of our internal prosperity, nor have I been as sanguine as those who are immediately conversant with those subjects. The funds had risen to a medium of interest paying three and three-fourths per cent. This commercial treaty, by increasing the demand of money, has lowered them, as our various trades have run wild in every species of purchase for the French market; but the credit given is so very short, that a few months will probably make a very sensible alteration in their value. But you will remember that, when you left England, Mr. Pitt was funding by raising money at seven per cent; and he may now command any sum he pleases, for paying Exchequer bills, at three per cent. In this situation, we may yet rejoice that we are English; and, leaving to America the blessings, real or imaginary, of her independence, let us comfort ourselves in the reflection, that four years have now shown that the most fortunate moment for Great Britain was that in which she bought her peace by the separation in commercial as well as political relations to the provinces of America. I do not in this mean to speak the language of resentment. I voted for the American War, because I thought our claim well founded; I deprecated the acknowledgment of her independence, as a measure big with ruin to this country; and experience has shown me the weakness of my opinions, by pointing out to me the commercial greatness of Great Britain, notwithstanding this separation, and in many points actually rising in consequence of it.

I have now troubled you too long; and will only detain you to observe, that your letter does not acknowledge either of the two which I have written to you in the present year. The last was sent to Lord

Carmarthen's office ; and I shall give this to the same conveyance, as I have reason, from many circumstances, to doubt the safety of any other channel of communication. I hope that you and your family are well ; and, with very many thanks for all your various communications and enclosures, which have reached me safely, I remain, dear sir, your very faithful and obedient servant,

NUGENT BUCKINGHAM.

P.S. — I forgot to tell you that Bath has restored me to a degree of health which I had not felt for these four years.

The Marquis of Buckingham to Sir John Temple.

PALL MALL, LONDON, 4th Oct., 1787.

The present conjuncture of affairs is so critical and full of anxious expectation, as to hush for a time the spirit of speculation and conjecture, and to fix the political eye in deep attention on the conduct of two great powers,—*the French and the Austrians*. A strict league, cemented by the bonds of affinity, has for some time united France and Austria, after they had been divided, by hostilities and animosities, for a period of little less than three centuries. But this amity between rival powers, it was easy to foresee, and has in fact been predicted by every political observer, was sooner or later to be shaken and overturned by some of those accidents that are perpetually changing the face of the world. The period of its duration seems now to be completed : France is politically attached both to the Hollanders and the Turks, and the Emperor is hostile to both. Can the Imperialists and the French draw the sword against each other on one side the Danube, and cordially embrace on the other ? It will be as difficult for his Imperial Majesty to make a distinction between a Frenchman in the Crimea and a Frenchman within the dominions of the Grande Monarque, as it is to separate, in his sentiments and mind, the King of Great Britain from the Elector of Hanover. With regard to the hostility of the Emperor to the Dutch Republic, it is true that he has equal cause of animosity against the Family of Orange ; but, in the first place, it is not the interest of the Imperial Court, in the present moment, to exhibit an example of successful rebellion in one-half of the Belgic provinces, while his own subjects, which form the other half, are in a state of commotion, and almost actual insurrection. It is time now for kings and princes to know the power of example, which will be found, on an enlarged and philosophical view, in reality to govern mankind. In the second place, if, in the present contest, the fortune of

the Hollanders should prevail against that of the Prince of Orange, the whole maritime force of the republic would be eventually thrown into the scale of France ; which, with that of Spain (should that Court be *again* successfully practised upon), would render the maritime power of the House of Bourbon the first in the world ! It is impossible, therefore, that such an event should be contemplated by the Emperor without jealousy and alarm ! Accordingly it may be concluded that he will favor the Stadtholder, if France should take an active part against him. Whether she will do this or not is *the grand point in question*, and which the recent irruption of the Prussians into the territories of the United Provinces must soon determine. In the mean time, it is hardly of moment (in a matter that must so soon be decided) to reason concerning the effects which the present discontents and pretensions, avowed by the friends of liberty in France, may produce in the councils of that Government respecting war or peace. It is evident, that, as self-preservation is the first law of nature, the French Court will be naturally inclined to divert that high spirit which pervades their nation from a spirit of internal reform to foreign attacks, and to convert animosity against the abettors of tyranny into national pride and the point of military honor. But *disordered finances* on the other hand, and a wish to give effectual succor to the Grand Signior, may dispose them to *accommodate* matters in Holland for the present ; while, by continued *intrigues*, they encourage their party and prepare for future hostilities on some more favorable occasion. While I am now employed in expressing these sentiments, intelligence is said to have arrived that the Prussian army hath not only reduced Utrecht, with many other towns, but also *the city of Amsterdam*, the strength of the United Provinces ! If this be so, the French will have a pretext either for peace or war. On the one hand, the irruption of the Prussians holds out the imposing plea of relief to the oppressed, if they are disposed to hazard an appeal to arms ; on the other, the dastardly cowardice of the Dutch patriots will afford ground of excuse to the French, if they should not. For how are the Hollanders to expect the French will fight for a people that shrink at the first approach of real danger, and will not defend themselves ? Courage and constancy find support ; the timid and irresolute (deserted by their very friends) are usually abandoned to their fate. It was not until the brave ancestors of these *degenerate Dutch* presented an intrepid front, and proved their resolution (by multiplied acts of active and passive courage), that they were assisted by Queen Elizabeth and Henry the

Fourth. It was not until the Americans had taken that scribbling general (Bourgoyne) with his army prisoners that they were assisted to any purpose by the French. If the Hollanders yet show determined courage, then and then only may they expect succor from their new allies.

It is thought, and on probable grounds, that there is a secret compact among the Prussians, the Emperor, and the French; the general object of which is to support each other's pretensions where they are in any degree reasonable, and do not interfere with one another. But the most immediate and particular view is *the partition of the Turkish dominions in Europe*. This *great object* will sufficiently explain *that breach of faith* which, if we may judge from present appearances, is *intended*, on the part of the French, towards their Batavian confederates.

It is become evident, almost to demonstration, that, in the late commercial treaty, the Court of France was not sincere, and that it had nothing so much in view as to *lull* the English nation into the *slumber* of peace, and the pleasant intoxication of temporary gain. They continued to build ships of war; they formed new harbors; they fomented such divisions in Holland as might, in the end, give the influence of France a decided and permanent superiority in the councils of that republic; and they entered into a close alliance with the Imperialists and the Russians. All these circumstances were intended as a preparation for a new attack on Great Britain, either in the East or West Indies, or both. It was not indeed to be expected that success in the cabinet and field (caused by the late American contest) would cease to produce its usual effects in the most ambitious and the most volatile nation in Europe. If the internal discontents in France and the *firm* conduct of Great Britain and Prussia should reduce the French to the necessity of *temporising* in the present juncture of affairs, yet still we ought to keep constantly on our guard; their ambitious views are only suspended, not abandoned. The British sovereign, court, and nation seem to be unanimous in opinion that the Stadtholder should be supported; and this obvious *wise policy* deserves commendation. If, however, we must draw the sword, let us beware of the conditions on which we sheath it. Great Britain depends for prosperity on her public credit; the disease that threatens her dissolution is *the accumulation of the public debt*. To aggravate and precipitate this morbid distemper, by entangling us in constant wars, is the inhuman policy of the Court of France, which, in this game of blood, she can play at less expense than Great Britain, and with less risk. Of what avail are the pitiful savings of a few years of peace, if a new war is to swallow

up, in its ensanguined vortex, our sinking fund? As we wisely imitate the conduct of the great opposer of French ambition, King William, in the spirited preparations now on foot for the support of the Stadtholder, let us imitate him also in his enlarged and profound views, in forming alliances and opposing art to art. It may be questioned whether English councils were guided by the soundest policy when we formed that new alliance in Germany, which determined Austria to depart from her ancient system, and to enter into an intimate union with a power that had successfully opposed her for near three centuries? In this refined and enlightened age, it is essential for politicians to *counteract* the designs of refined ambition, by uniting the minds of princes in the defence of justice. If we sit down quietly (as some of our statesmen advise), and apply ourselves wholly to the fabrication of manufactures, we may certainly grow rich; but we shall lose the political and military spirit; we shall become effeminate; and some warlike nation will sweep away our accumulated wealth,—just as we drain the treasures from the manufactures of India, and as the Prussians *may now* make themselves masters of the *thirty millions* sterling deposited in the Bank of Amsterdam! It is undoubtedly the policy of Great Britain to detach the emperor from his French alliance, by assisting him to recover Franche Comté, Alsace, Lorraine, and other territories wrested from his ancestors in the Low Countries. The French must now be effectually checked and brought [to] reason; otherwise, they will continue to distress and harrass their peaceful neighbors by the rage of their restless ambition. With regard to the Austrian Netherlands, the late insurrection at Brussels proves the *insidious* policy of the emperor, who, after repeated declarations of moderate and just designs, manifestly discovered an intention of *slipping the yoke* of slavery over a generous people. But their political wisdom and foresight yet remain to be proved, by some *arrangements* that will secure their liberties, against the sudden attacks of a restless and ambitious sovereign, who has discovered a desire of reducing them under obedience, even by stratagems and conspiracies.

Thus have I hastily given you my sentiments on the present state of affairs on this side the water. A few days or *hours* may, however, change perhaps the whole complexion of them; which continues us in anxious expectation for *the result* of Mr. Grenville's negotiation. With regard to America, we have had no interesting accounts of late, nor hath any thing yet reached us concerning the deliberations of the convention assembled at Philadelphia.